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Abstract—Machine learning (ML) classifiers are invaluable
building blocks that have been used in many fields. High quality
training dataset collected from multiple data providers is essential
to train accurate classifiers. However, it raises concern about
data privacy due to potential leakage of sensitive information in
training dataset. Existing studies have proposed many solutions
to privacy-preserving training of ML classifiers, but it remains a
challenging task to strike a balance among accuracy, computa-
tional efficiency, and security.
In this paper, we propose Heda, an efficient privacy-
preserving scheme for training ML classifiers. By combining
homomorphic cryptosystem (HC) with differential privacy (DP),
Heda obtains the tradeoffs between efficiency and accuracy, and
enables flexible switch among different tradeoffs by parameter
tuning. In order to make such combination efficient and feasible,
we present novel designs based on both HC and DP: A library of
building blocks based on partially HC are proposed to construct
complex training algorithms without introducing a trusted third-
party or computational relaxation; A set of theoretical methods
are proposed to determine appropriate privacy budget and to re-
duce sensitivity. Security analysis demonstrates that our solution
can construct complex ML training algorithm securely. Extensive
experimental results show the effectiveness and efficiency of the
proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) classifiers are widely used in
many fields, such as spam detection, image classification, and
natural language processing. Many studies have modeled user
data and obtained satisfactory classifiers that meet accuracy
requirements [19], [36]. The accuracy of a classifier obtained
from supervised learning is closely related to the quality of the
training dataset, in addition to well-designed ML algorithms.
An experimental study with a dataset of 300 million images at
Google [29] demonstrates that the performance of classifiers
increases as the order of magnitude of training data grows.
However, training dataset is usually held by multiple data
providers and may contain sensitive information, so it is
important to protect data privacy in training of ML classifiers.
Consider the typical training process depicted in Figure
1. There are multiple data providers and a single data user.
Upon receiving the request of dataset from the data user, each
data provider applies privacy-preserving mechanisms (e.g.,
encryption or perturbation) to its own dataset. Then, the data
user trains an ML classifier based on the dataset gathered from
multiple data providers. During this process, each data provider
Fig. 1. Application Scenario. Each non-shaded rectangle represents a type
of role. Each shaded box indicates private data that should be accessible to
only one party: a protected dataset to a data provider, and the model to the
data user. Each solid arrow indicates an algorithm or a process.
cannot know the classifier, while the data user cannot learn any
sensitive information of the shared data.
More specifically, consider the following example of an
advertisement recommendation task: In order to attract more
consumers, an company wants to build a classifier to discern
the most appropriate time for advertising. The training dataset
used for constructing the classifier is extracted from the
consumer purchase behavior data recorded by several online
shopping sites. The consumer data is confidential because
it contains sensitive information about consumers. Online
shopping sites agree to share their data with companies, but
refuse to reveal any privacy of the consumers. The company
wants to construct a classifier based on the consumer data,
but is unwilling to reveal the classifier to online shopping
sites. Ideally, online shopping sites and the company run a
privacy-preserving training algorithm, at the end of which the
company learns the classifier parameters, and neither party
learns anything else about the other party’s input.
In general, supervised ML classifiers consist of two phases:
the training phase and the classification phase. A series of
secure schemes for the classification phase have been proposed
[6], [10]. In this paper, we focus on the training phase, that is,
privacy-preserving training of ML classifiers1.
Existing solutions to training ML classifier securely
roughly depend on three types of techniques, namely secure
multi-party computing (SMC), homomorphic cryptosystem
(HC), and differential privacy (DP). SMC can construct many
classifiers theoretically. But it relies on a trusted third-party
for providing random number, and results in a large number
of interactions and redundant computations for protecting data
1In this paper, ML classifers and ML models are used interchangeably.
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privacy [15], [23]. HC2 allows the operation on ciphertext
to be mapped to the corresponding plaintext. The secure
training solutions based on HC [11], [17] may suffer from low
efficiency. In addition, since partially HC only enables a single
type of operation (e.g., addition or multiplication), HC-based
solutions for training complex ML classifiers usually introduce
a trusted third-party (e.g., the authorization server [10], [17])
or use an approximate equation that simplifies the complex
iteration formula [2], [3]. DP can resist the attacker with the
largest background knowledge [5], which ensures the security
of the published data by adding noises. The computational ef-
ficiency of operations on perturbed data is significantly higher
than those on ciphertext [5], [9]. Nevertheless, the quality of
the published dataset is reduced due to the introduction of
noises, and thereby the accuracy of the resulting classifiers is
decreased inevitably.
As discussed above, HC is low efficient due to ciphertext-
based computation, but can obtain a classifier with lossless
accuracy. DP has high computational efficiency but leads to
an inevitable loss of accuracy. Intuitively, we can take the
strengths of HC and DP by adopting them simultaneously.
However, HC and DP are completely different systems:
one for data encryption, and the other for data perturbation.
It is a challenging task to combine them together. In par-
ticular, partially HC only supports one type of operation,
which sets a barrier to the training of ML classifiers with
complex operations such as power function, division, and
square root. Furthermore, the noises added to sensitive data
in DP determines the accuracy of classifiers and privacy of
published data. The third challenge is how to archive high
accuracy while ensuring privacy in DP.
In this paper, we propose Heda, an efficient privacy-
preserving scheme for training ML classifiers. By combining
HC with DP, Heda obtains the tradeoffs between efficiency
and accuracy and enables flexible switch among different
tradeoffs by parameter tuning. Security analysis demonstrates
that our building blocks can construct complex ML training
algorithms. Extensive experimental results show the effective-
ness and efficiency of the proposed scheme.
We address the above challenges by developing a set of
key techniques.
We make an observation that different features3 in a dataset
usually contribute differently to the accuracy of classifiers [21],
[31]. For the features with high contributions, we apply HC
to these features such that the model parameters obtained
from them are as accurate as possible. We apply DP to the
rest features to improve the computational efficiency. The
contribution of each feature in training ML classifiers can be
evaluated using readily available techniques [21].
To address the second challenge, we employ two homo-
morphic encryption primitives: a multiplicative homomorphic
encryption RSA and an additively homomorphic encryption
Paillier. We carefully design a library of building blocks
2In this paper, we only consider partially HC due to the computational
inefficiency of fully HC.
3Without loss of generality, when facing the same training task, we assume
that all the dataset has been locally preprocessed and represented with the
same feature vectors [17], [32].
supporting for complex operations such as power function and
dot product, which can handle ML classifiers with complex
training operations. We take Logical Regression (LR) as an
example to illustrate the power of our building blocks. The
sigmoid function in the iterative formula of LR makes it
difficult to construct a secure LR training algorithm based
on HC. It is the first time that constructing a secure LR
training algorithm by HC without an authorization server or
any approximation. (Section VI)
In the face of the third challenge, we develop a formal
method to determine the reasonable privacy budget, and we
reduce the sensitivity by using insensitive microaggregation.
We reduce the added noise and improve the usability of the
noise dataset published by DP reasonably. (Section V)
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first study that
achieves privacy-preserving training of ML classifiers by
jointly applying HC and DP in an individual scheme. The
rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
related work, and Section III provides the background. Section
IV describes the problem statement. Section V and Section
VI present the special designs with DP and HC, respectively.
Section VII describes the construction of Heda in detail.
The security analysis is exhibited in Section VIII, and the
evaluation results are provided in Section IX. Section X
concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Since our work is related to secure ML classifiers al-
gorithms which can be broadly divided into two categories:
privacy-preserving classification and privacy-preserving train-
ing. We give the literature review of both subjects. Because
Heda jointly applying HC and DP, and there are some studies
about combining HC with DP but not about secure classifiers
training, we present a discussion about these works. We give
an analysis of our novelty at last.
A. Privacy-Preserving ML Classification
A series of techniques have been developed for privacy-
preserving ML Classification. Wang et al. [33] proposed an
encrypted image classification algorithm based on multi-layer
extreme learning machine that is able to directly classify en-
crypted images without decryption. They assumed the classifier
had been trained, and the classifier not confidential. Grapel et
al. [18] constructed several secure classification algorithms by
HC, while the parameters of trained classifiers are not confi-
dential for classifiers users. Zhu et al. [37] proposed a secure
nonlinear kernel SVM classification algorithm, which is able
to keep users’ health information and healthcare provider’s
prediction model confidential.
Several works have designed general (non-application spe-
cific) privacy-preserving protocols and explored a set of com-
mon classifiers by HC [6], [10]. Usually, classification algo-
rithms are simpler than training algorithms, building blocks
that are able to build classification algorithms can be powerless
for complex training algorithms.
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B. Privacy-Preserving ML Classifier Training
Three techniques have been applied to privacy-preserving
ML classifier training, they are SMC, HC, and DP. Con-
structing secure classifier training algorithms based on SMC
relies on a large number of interactions and many redundant
calculations for protect privacy, and it generally needs to
introduce authoritative third parties to provide random number
distribution services as well. In addition, SMC protocols for
generic functions existing in practice rely on heavy crypto-
graphic machinery. Applying them directly to model training
algorithms would be inefficient [4], [23], [35].
HC is able to compute using only encrypted values. Em-
ploying HC, many secure algorithms have been developed for
different specialized ML training algorithms such as Support
Vector Machine (SVM) [17], [27], LR [11], [18], decision trees
[30] and Naive Bayes [24]. However, partially HC only enables
a single type of operation (e.g., addition or multiplication).
In order to construct complex training algorithms, HC-based
schemes usually need to rely on trusted third parties such as
the Authorization Server [10], [17], or use an approximate
equation to simplify the original complex iteration formula
into a simple one [2], [3]. Gonzlez et al. [17] developed secure
addition protocol and secure substractions protocol to construct
the secure SVM training algorithm by employing Paillier,
while some operations that are not supported by Paillier have
to be implemented with the assistance of the Authorization
Server in their scheme. Secure LR training algorithms existing
implemented by HC are actually the linear regression [11],
[18], because the sigmoid function contains power function and
division operation, which makes LR training algorithms harder
to be implemented by HC than other ML training algorithms.
Several works solved the sigmoid function by an approximate
equation4 [2], [3].
Many secure ML classifier training algorithms have been
explored in DP area such as decision tree [5], LR [9] and
deep learning [1]. Blum et al. [5] proposed the first DP
based decision tree training algorithm on the SuLQ platform.
Abadi et al. [1] applied DP objective perturbation in a deep
learning algorithm, where the noise was added to every step
of the stochastic gradient descent. Due to the introduction
of noise under DP mechanisms, the quality of the datasets
were reduced, and the accuracy of these trained models was
decreased inevitably. So the essential challenge for DP based
frameworks is guaranteeing the accuracy by reducing the added
noise, especially for the operation has high sensitivities [38].
According to the Laplace mechanism (cf. Definition 4), privacy
budget  and the sensitivity ∆f are two important factors
affecting noise addition. In many papers, the value of  is
merely chosen arbitrarily or assumed to be given [1], [5]. Lee
et al. [22] explored the selection rules of  , but they have
not given a way to determine the value of the privacy budget.
Soria et al. [28] proposed a insensitive microaggregation-based
DP mechanism, they found the amount of noise required to
fulfill -DP can be reduced in insensitive microaggregation.
Heda develops the insensitive microaggregation-based DP
mechanism and decreases the amount of noise required to
fulfill -DP again.
4log( 1
1+exp(u)
) ≈
k∑
j=0
a · u
C. Homomorphic Cryptosystem Combine Differential Privacy
Several works have studied combining HC with DP to
solve a special security problem. Pathak et al. [26] proposed a
scheme for composing a DP aggregate classifier using classi-
fiers trained locally by separate mutually untrusting parties,
where HC was used for composing the trained classifiers.
Yilmaz et al. [34] proposed a scheme for optimal location
selection utilizing HC as the building block and employing
DP to formalize privacy in statistical databases. Aono et al.
[3] constructed a secure LR training algorithm via HC and
achieved DP to protect the model parameters. These works
general constructed a secure algorithm via HC and used DP
to protect the algorithm results. As we have discussed above,
constructing a secure algorithm via HC is low efficient, and
secure algorithm based on DP has inevitable loss in accuracy.
We aim of constructing a secure classifier training algorithm
jointly applying HC and DP in an individual scheme to obtain
a tradeoff between efficiency and accuracy.
D. Novelty of Our Construction
Secure training algorithms based on HC have to handle
datasets in ciphertext case, where the time consumption is
considerable, while the accuracy is able to be guaranteed.
Noise datasets published by DP mechanism are in plaintext
case, it is efficient to train a model in plaintext case, while
using the noise dataset may lead to a low accuracy. HC and
DP have drawbacks as well as merits.
Heda takes the strengths of HC and DP to get a high-
efficiency and high-accuracy privacy-preserving ML classifier
training algorithm. Heda is the first to combine these two
techniques and construct a privacy-preserving ML classifier
training algorithm in a multi-party setting, where feature
evaluation techniques are employed to give the way of combi-
nation. By combining HC with DP, Heda obtains the tradeoffs
between efficiency and accuracy, and enables flexible switch
among different tradeoffs by parameter tuning. What’s more,
we develop a library of building blocks by HC that is able
to construct complex training algorithms, and by using our
building blocks this is the first time that solving the sigmoid
function in secure LR training based on HC without any
approximate equation. We develop the works of Lee et al.
[22] and Soria et al. [28] giving a formula to determine
the appropriate privacy budget and another lower sensitive
solution.
III. PRILIMINARIES
A. Notation
A dataset D is an unordered set of n records with the
size of |D|. xi ∈ Rd, xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xid) is the i-th
record in dataset D, and yi is a class label correspond to
xi. X = (x1, x2, . . . , xm), Y = (y1, y2, . . . , ym). β, ω, and
b are the relevant parameters of the model trained by a ML
algorithm. The subset Ai corresponding to the i-th attribute in
D. S is the scores assign to the features.
Cryptosystems define a plaintext space M, and a ciphertext
space C. In Heda, we employ two public-key cryptosystems,
Paillier and RSA. [[m]] and ||m|| are represented as the
ciphertext of m under Paillier or RSA respectively.
DP is generally achieved by a randomized algorithm M.
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TABLE I. NOTATIONS
Notations Explanation Notations Explanation
R Set of real numbers Rd d-dimension R
D Dataset |D| The size of D
m Size of dataset D′ Neighbour dataset
X The record set in D Y The label set in D
xi i-th Record in dataset yi Class label
o, σ Functional operation d Dataset dimension
M Plaintext space β, b Parameters of models
M Mechanism C Ciphertext space
k The cluster size N n-bit Primes
f Query  Privacy budget
γ Noise ∆f Sensitivity
[[m]] Ciphertext under Pail-
lier
||m|| Ciphertext under RSA
ι The number of en-
crypted features in D
S The scores of features
[m] The encryption of m
under a certain cryp-
tosystems
Ai The subset of i-th at-
tribute in D
 is the privacy budget in a DP mechanism. A query f maps
dataset D to an abstract range f : D → R. The maximal
difference in the results of query f is defined as the sensitivity
∆f . D′ is a neighboring dataset of D.
Table I summarizes the notations used in the following
sections.
B. Homomorphic Cryptosystem
Cryptosystems are composed of three algorithms: key gen-
eration (Gen) to generate the key, encryption (Enc) encrypting
secret message and decryption (Dec) for decrypting ciphertext.
Public-key cryptosystems employ a pair of keys (PK, SK),
the public key (PK, the encryption key) and the private key
(SK, the decryption key). Some cryptosystems are gifted with
a property of homomorphic that makes cryptosystems perform
a set of operations on encrypted data without knowledge of the
decryption key. Formalized definition is given in Definition 1.
Definition 1: (homomorphic) [20]. A public-key encryp-
tion scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) is homomorphic if for all n and
all (PK,SK) output by Gen (1n), it is possible to define groups
M, C (depending on PK only) such that:
(i) The message space is M, and all ciphertexts output by
Encpk are elements of C.
(ii) For any m1,m2 ∈ M, any c1 output by
Encpk (m1), and any c2 output by Encpk (m2), it holds that
Decsk (o (c1, c2)) = σ (m1,m1).
In Heda, we employ two public-key cryptosystems, Paillier
and RSA. Paillier possesses additively homomorphic property,
and RSA possesses multiplicative. For more details about
Paillier or RSA, we refer the reader to [20].
Paillier. The security of Paillier is based on an assumption
related to the hardness of factoring. Assuming a pair of cipher-
text (c1, c2) is (m1,m2) under the same Paillier encryption
scheme where the public key is N , we have: c1 × c1 =[[
(1 +N)
m1+m2rNmodN2
]]
, where (m1 +m2) < N . The
additively homomorphic property in Paillier can be described
as [[m1 +m2]] = [[m1]]× [[m2]]
(
modN2
)
.
RSA. Based on the definition of a one-way trapdoor
function, RSA gives the actual implementation of the first
public key cryptosystem. RSA is a multiplicative HC, because
that: EncRSA (m1)×EncRSA (m2) = ||(m1 ×m2)emodN ||,
where (m1 ×m2) < N . The multiplicative homomorphic
property in RSA can be described as ||m1 ×m2|| = ||m1|| ×
||m2|| (modN).
C. Differential Privacy
Definition 2: (Neighbor Dataset) [5]. The datasets D and
D′ have the same attribute structure, and the symmetry differ-
ence between them is denoted as |D M D′|. We call D and
D′ neighbour datasets if |D M D′| = 1.
Definition 3: (-Differential Privacy) [5]. A randomized
mechanism M gives -DP for every set of outputs R, and
for any neighbor dataset of D and D′, if M satisfies:
Pr [M (D) ∈ R] ≤ exp ()× Pr [M (D′) ∈ R].
A smaller  represents a stronger privacy level [38]. While
 is equal to 0, for any neighbour dataset, the randomized
mechanism M will output two identical results of the same
probability distribution which cannot reflect any useful in-
formation. If  is selected as a too large value in a DP
mechanism, it does not mean that privacy is actually enforced
by the mechanism. A composition theorem for  named parallel
composition (Theorem 1) is widely used.
Theorem 1: (Parallel Composition) [25]. Suppose we have
a set of privacy mechanisms M = {M1,M2, . . . . . . ,Mm}.
If each Mi provides a i-DP guaranteed on a dis-
jointed subset of the entire dataset, M will provide
(max {1, 2, . . . . . . , m})-DP.
Lapace Mechanism (Definition 4) is the basic DP im-
plementation mechanism and is suitable for the numerical
data, which adds independent noise following the Laplace
distribution to the true answer.
Definition 4: (Laplace mechanism) [14]. For a dataset D
and a query function f : D → R with sensitive ∆f . Privacy
mechanisms M (D) = f (D) + γ providers -DP, where
γ ∼ lap
(
∆f

)
represents the noise sampled from a Laplace
distribution with a scaling of
(
∆f

)
.
Definition 5: (Sensitivity) [5]. For a query f : D → R,
and a pair of neighbor datasets (D, D′), the sensitivity of f is
defined as: ∆f = max
D,D′
||f (D)− f (D′)||1. Sensitivity ∆f is
only related to the type of query f . It considers the maximal
difference between the query results.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We are devoted to addressing the problem on the secure
training of ML classifier using private protected data gathered
from different data providers. In this section, we introduce the
overview of the system model and the roles involved in Heda.
Then, we formally define the threat model and the security
goal.
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A. System Model
We target at the system application scenario which has
been illustrated in Figure 1. There are n data providers P
and a data user U in our model. Each P holds their own
sensitive dataset Di and a pair of keys (PK, SK). P protects
their sensitive data by applying privacy-preserving mechanisms
(e.g., DP mechanism and HC). U holds his own keys (PK,
SK). After obtaining the permission, U requests the sensitive
data from P , and P returns the protected data. By running
a sequence of secure interactive protocols with several P , U
obtains the classifier parameters of being encrypted by U’s
keys.
As discussed in Section I and II, HC is able to construct ac-
curate secure training algorithms, and DP mechanism providers
high efficient secure training algorithms. However, it is low
efficient that constructing a secure ML training algorithm by
HC, and the model may poor in accuracy if the training data is
under DP mechanism. We thereby desire to take the strengths
of HC and DP, and feature evaluation techniques is used for
providing a right combination method. We describe the overall
idea of Heda as follows:
1) P scores all features by feature evaluation techniques
and divides the dataset into two parts according to the scores
(see Section VII-A).
2) P applies privacy-preserving mechanisms to the two
parts respectively: the low scores part published by DP mech-
anism (see Section V); the high scores part encrypted by HC
(see Section VI).
3) Upon receiving the query requests, P sends the protected
data to U .
4) U trains a ML classifier under these two protected sub-
datasets (see Section VII-C).
B. Threat Model
U interacts with several P to obtain the protected data and
performs training algorithms on the data. Each P trys to learn
as much other P’s sensitive data and U’s trained classifier
as possible by honestly executing pre-defined protocols. U
follows the protocol honestly, but it tries to infer P’s sensitive
data as much as possible from the values he learns. As
discussed above, we assume each participant is a passive (or
honest-but-curious) adversary [16], that is, it does follow the
protocols but tries to infer others’ privacy as much as possible
from the values they learn.
C. Security Goal
In Heda, we allow any two or more parties conspire to steal
the privacy of other participants. We make the following as-
sumptions: Each participate as a honest-but-curious adversary
performs protocol honestly but may have interest in the private
information of other domains. Any two or more participates
may collude with each other. As passive adversaries, they do
follow the protocol but try to infer other’s privacy as much as
possible from the values they learn.
The aim of Heda is achieving keeping privacy of each
participant and computing model parameters securely when
facing honest-but-curious adversaries or any collusion. To be
specific, the privacy of U is model parameters, and each P is
their sensitive data. We specify our security goals as follows:
1) When facing honest-but-curious adversaries, U and
each P’s privacy are confidential.
2) when facing any two or more parties collude with
each other, U and each P’s privacy are confidential.
V. ACCURACY AND PRIVACY DESIGN WITH
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
DP ensures the security of the published data by adding
noise. Insufficient noise leads to the security of the published
data cannot be guaranteed, while excess noise causes the
data unusable. Obviously, the key to using DP in the secure
classifier training is to reduce the added noise while ensuring
the security of the published data.
The two important parameters that determine the added
noise are  and ∆f (cf. Definition 4). A bigger  or a smaller
∆f are able to reduce the added noise. However, if  is
selected as a too large value, although the system has been built
upon DP framework, it dose not mean that privacy is actually
enforced by the system. Therefore,  must be combined with
specific requirements to achieve the balance of security and
usability of output results. On the other hand, ∆f is only
determined by the type of query function (cf. Definition 5).
In this section, we develop a formula for reasonably
determining the appropriate  in DP mechanism, and we reduce
the ∆f by using insensitive microaggregation.
A. Selection of Appropriate 
In many papers,  is chosen arbitrarily or assumed to be
given, while decision on  should be made carefully with
considerations of the domain and the acceptable ranges of risk
of disclosure. Lee et al. [22] explored the rule of , but they
did not give a specific method for determining . We give a
method for determining . It is worth noting that based on
different criteria and backgrounds,  can have different values,
and we are trying to give a general one.
We follow some notations of Lee et al. [22]: If an adversary
knows all the background knowledge, he tries to guess which
one is the different values between D′ and D. Let W denotes
the set of all possible combinations ω of D′, ω ∈W. For each
possible ω, the adversary maintains a set of tuples 〈α, µ〉. For a
given query response, α and µ are the adversary’s prior belief
and posterior belief on D′, i.e., ∀ω ∈W, α (ω) = 1m . For each
possible ω, the adversary’s posterior belief on ω is defined as
µ (ω) = P (D′ = ω|γ) = P (M(ω)=γ)∑
ω∈W P (M(ω)=γ) . Lee et al. [22]
obtain the upper bound of  through a series of derivations as
Formula 1 (cf. Section V in [22])
 ≤ ∆f
∆v
ln
(
(m− 1) ρ
1− ρ
)
(1)
where ∆v = max1≤i,j≤n,i 6=j |f(ωi)− f(ωj)|, ρ is the proba-
bility that the adversary guessing success. Nevertheless, Lee et
al. [22] did not give a method for setting ρ. We give a method
for determining the upper bound of ρ (Proposition 1).
Proposition 1 (the upper bound of ρ for D′): Let Aj is
the subset of the j-th attribute in dataset D. Countmax is
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Algorithm 1 Generating Appropriate Value of 
Input : D = {(xi, yi)}mi=1.
Output : The appropriate  on dataset D.
1: for j = 1 to d do
2: for i = 1 to m do
3: Computing ∆f and Countmax|Aj | in Aj .
4: Obtaining j by Formula 1.
5: return  = {1, 2, . . . . . . , d}.
the occurrences number of the record which has the highest
frequency in Aj . Then Countmax|Aj | is the upper bound of ρ.
Proof 1 (Proof of Proposition 1): ρ is the probability that
the adversary successfully guesses which instance is the dif-
ferent one between D′ and D. DP mechanism assumes that
the adversary has a strong background knowledge, that is, he
knows the value of each instance in D. xij is the highest
frequency instance in Aj , so the adversary guesses xij will
get the highest probability of success. After DP mechanism,
the adversary’s probability of success should not be greater
than the highest probability of random guessing and success,
so the upper bound of ρ is Countmax|Aj | . 
The upper bound of i is obtained form each subset Ai by
Formula 1, then the dataset D provides max (i)-DP according
to Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 details the steps for generating the
appropriate  on dataset D.
B. Reducing ∆f by Insensitive Microaggregation
According to the Definition 4, the smaller the ∆f , the less
noise is added, and thereby the more usable the data is. In this
subsection, we detail the solution of reducing the ∆f in Heda.
The amount of noise required to fulfill -DP can be greatly
reduced if the query is run on a insensitive microaggregation
version of all attributes instead of running it on the raw input
data [28].
1) What is insensitive microaggregation: Microaggregation
is used to protect microdata releases and works by clustering
groups of individuals and replacing them by the group centroid.
DP makes no assumptions about the adversary’s background
knowledge. Microaggregation with DP can help increasing the
utility of DP query outputs while making as few assumptions
on the type of queries as microaggregation does [28]. However,
if we modify one record in D, more than one clusters will
differ from the original clusters generally. According to the
Definition 3, we expect that we modify one record in D,
each pair of corresponding clusters differs at most in single
record. Microaggregation that satisfies this property is named
insensitive microaggregation (IMA). Soria et al. [28] give a
formal definition of IMA. Microaggregation is insensitive to
input data if and only if the distance function Dist(x, y) is a
fixed sequence of total order relations defined over the domain
of D [28].
The sequence of total orders is determined by a sequence
of reference points. The reference points are the two boundary
points P and P ′, i.e. P = (p1, p2, . . . , pd), pi = max (Ai),
and P ′ = (p′1, p
′
2, . . . , p
′
d), p
′
i = min (Ai). The total order
relations between two points in Heda is: Dist (x, y) =
Algorithm 2 Generating an IMA Dataset
Input : D = {(xi, yi)}mi=1 ,k is the cluster size, m ≥ 2k.
Output : A IMA dataset DIMA that can perform DP.
1: Set i := 0
2: while |D| ≥ 2k do
3: Computing the boundary point P and P ′.
4: Ci ← k nearest instances to P from D according to
Dist (x, y), D := D\Ci.
5: Ci+1 ←k nearest instances to P ′ from D according to
Dist (x, y), D := D\Ci+1.
6: i := i+ 2
7: Ci ← remaining records.
8: Computing each centroid of Ci and use it to replace the records
in each cluster.
9: return DIMA.
√
d∑
i=0
(xi−yi)2
(Pi−P ′i )
2 . Generating a IMA dataset is detailed in Al-
gorithm 2.
2) Determining the sensitivity: As Definition 5, ∆fj =
max (Aj) in dataset D, and the sensitivity in IMA is
∆fj
k × m2k ,
which is formalized in the Proposition 2. We detail Algorithm
3 constructing our DP mechanism.
Proposition 2 (∆f in IMA): fj (D) is a query function
with -DP mechanism returning the noised values correspond-
ing to the j-th attribute of D. After obtaining DIMA by
Algorithm 2, the sensitivity of DIMA with cluster size k is
∆f ′j (D) =
∆fj
k × m2k , where ∆fj = max (Aj).
Proof 2 (Proof of Proposition 2): If M is an IMA algo-
rithm, for every pair of datasets D and D′ differing in a
single record, there is a bijection between the set of clusters
{C1, . . . , Cn} and
{
C
′
1, ..., C
′
n
}
such that each pair of corre-
sponding clusters differs at most in a single record. So if the
centroid is computed as the mean of the records in the same
cluster, then the maximum change in any centroid is, at most,
∆fj
k . The modification of single record may lead to multiple
modifications of the centroid of clusters, and there are
⌈
m
k
⌉
5
different clusters in D.
According to a distance function Dist() with an total order
relation, IMA algorithm iteratively takes sets with cardinality k
from the extreme points until less than 2k records are left. The
less than 2k records are formed the last cluster Cr that is the
cluster at the center of the total order relation sequence. Every
xi in D is ordered by Dist(). A pair of databases (D,D′)
differing only in one instance xi means the larger database
contains just one additional row [13]. The number of clusters
on the left and the right of Cr is equal, as shown in the Figure
2. If the different record in (D,D′) is xi on the left of Cr and
xi is located to Ci. Then the changed clusters are the clusters
from Ci to Cr, and the maximum change for each changed
cluster is ∆fjk . Other clusters on the right side of Cr will not
be changed. The worst scenario is when xi is located to C1,
there is the maximum number
⌈
m
2k
⌉
of changed clusters. The
scenario on the left and the right sides of Cr is symmetrical,
so the number of changed clusters is at most
⌈
m
2k
⌉
. 
5d e denotes a ceiling functions.
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Fig. 2. Clusters in IMA
Algorithm 3 IMA -DP Mechanism
Input : D = {(xi, yi)}mi=1 ,k is the cluster size, m ≥ 2k.
Output : An IMA -DP dataset DIMA−.
1: Generating the appropriate  on dataset D by Algorithm 1.
2: Obtaining an IMA dataset DIMA from D by Algorithm 2.
3: Obtaining noise by using  and ∆fj (cf. the definition of Laplace
mechanism 4).
4: Adding xi = xi + noise to DIMA−.
5: return DIMA−.
To make the sensitivity of DIMA smaller than the original
dataset, we let ∆fjk × m2k ≤ ∆fj , then we can get the best
cluster size: k =
√
m
2 . Soria et al. [13] thought that D
′ and
D differ in a “modified” record xi. The modification causes
the whole sequence originally obtained by Dist() is changed
from the position of xi in turn. So they considered the sensitive
is ∆f ′j (D) =
∆fj
k × mk . However, Dwork er al. [13] give
that: “On pairs of Adjacent Dataset (D,D′) differing only in
one row, meaning one is a subset of the other and the larger
database contains just one additional row.” Their sensitive
method causes a greater sensitivity than ours, which reduces
the usability of the dataset.
VI. PRIVACY DESIGN WITH HOMOMORPHIC
CRYPTOSYSTEM
A homomorphic encryption algorithm can only support one
type of operation (e.g., Addition or Multiplication). Existing
HC-based secure training algorithms need to rely on trusted
third parties such as the Authorization Server [10], [17], or
use an approximate equation to simplify the original complex
iteration formula [2], [3].
We elaborately design a library of building blocks by
multiplicative homomorphic encryption RSA and additively
homomorphic encryption Paillier, which is able to construct
complex secure ML training algorithms needing no the Au-
thorization Server or any approximate equation. In order to
illustrate the power of our building blocks, we construct a
secure LR training algorithm (see Section VII-B). It is the first
solving the sigmoid function based on HC. In this section,
we detail our building blocks. The security proofs for each
building block are given in Section VIII.
ML training algorithms are computationally complex, so
the building blocks need to support a range of choices includ-
ing which party gets the input, which party gets the output,
and whether the input or output are encrypted or not. Table
II shows the different conditions for building blocks. For all
conditions, both parties Alice and Bob cannot obtain other
useful information except for the legal information, the input
and output of other parties are confidential.
1) Secure addition and secure subtraction: Relying on
Paillier’s additive homomorphic property, it is straightforward
Protocol 1 Secure Addition Protocol
Input Alice: a = {a1, a2, . . . . . . , ad}, (PKAlice, SKAlice).
Input Bob: PKAlice, [[b]]Alice = [[{b1, b2, . . . . . . , bd}]]Alice or
b={b1, b2, . . . . . . , bd}.
Output Bob: [[f (a, b)]]Alice = [[a+ b]]Alice.
1: Alice sends [[a]]Alice to Bob.
2: for i to d do
3: Bob computes
[[
f(a, b)i
]]
Alice
= [[bi]]Alice × [[ai]]Alice.
4: return [[f (a, b)]]Alice to Bob.
Protocol 2 Secure Subtraction Protocol
Input Alice: a = {a1, a2, . . . . . . , ad}, (PKAlice, SKAlice).
Input Bob: PKAlice, [[b−1]]Alice = [[
{
b−11 , b
−1
2 , . . . , b
−1
d
}
]]
Alice
or
b−1 =
{
b−11 , b
−1
2 , . . . , b
−1
d
}
.
Output Bob: [[f (a, b)]]Alice = [[a− b]]Alice.
1: Alice sends [[a]]Alice to Bob.
2: for i to d do
3: Bob computes
[[
f(a, b)i
]]
Alice
=
[[
b−1i
]]
Alice
× [[ai]]Alice.
4: return [[f (a, b)]]Alice to Bob.
Protocol 3 Secure Dot Product Protocol
Input Alice: a = {a1, a2, . . . . . . , ad}, (PKAlice, SKAlice).
Input Bob: b = {b1, b2, . . . . . . , bd} and PKAlice.
Output Bob: [[f (a, b)]]Alice = [[a× b]]Alice.
1: Alice sends [[a]]Alice to Bob.
2: Bob computes [[f (a, b)]]Alice =
d∏
i=1
[[ai]]
bi
Alice.
3: return [[f(a, b)]]Alice to Bob.
Protocol 4 Secure Multiplication Protocol
Input Alice: a, (PKAlice, SKAlice).
Input Bob: ||b||Alice and PKAlice.
Output Bob: ||f(a, b)||Alice = ||a× b||Alice.
1: Alice sends ||a||Alice to Bob.
2: Bob computes ||f(a, b)||Alice = ||a||Alice × ||b||Alice.
3: return ||f(a, b)||Alice to Bob.
to obtain the secure addition protocol (Protocol 1) and secure
subtraction protocol (Protocol 2).
2) Secure dot product and secure multiplication: Using
Paillier’s additive homomorphism property, we can construct a
secure dot product protocol (Protocol 3) that satisfies Condition
1 easy (i.e., [[a× b]] = [[a]]b). However, when Bob only has
ciphertext [[b]]Alice who is unable to perform [[a]]
b
Alice. Paillier
fails to construct a secure dot product protocol that satisfies
Condition 2. Because the length of Paillier’s ciphertext is 1024
bits or longer usually (We will discuss the key length setting
in detail in Section IX.), so the computational complexity of
[[a]]
[[b]] is awfully large. Therefor, when faced with Condition
2, we use RSA’s multiplicative homomorphism property to
construct secure multiplication protocol (Protocol 4).
3) Secure power function: In order to cope with more
complex training algorithms, we design protocol 5 satisfying
Condition 1 under RSA to obtain ||eab|| securely.
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TABLE II. THE CONDITIONS OF BUILDING BLOCKS
Conditions Input Output Protocols
Alice Bob Alice Bob
Condition 1 SKA, PKB, a SKB, PKA, b - [f(a, b)]A 1, 2, 3, 5
Condition 2 SKA, PKB, a SKB, PKA, [b]A - [f(a, b)]A 1, 2, 4
Condition 3 SKA, PKB SKB, PKA, ||f(a, b)||A - [[f(a, b)]]A 6
Condition 4 SKA, PKB SKB, PKA, [[f(a, b)]]A - [[f(a, b)]]B 7
Protocol 5 Secure Power Function Protocol
Input Alice: a = {a1, a2, . . . . . . , ad}, (PKAlice, SKAlice).
Input Bob: b = {b1, b2, . . . . . . , bd} and PKAlice.
Output Bob:
∥∥eab∥∥
Alice
.
1: Alice sends ‖ea‖Alice = ‖{ea1 , ea2 , . . . ead}‖Alice to Bob.
2: Bob Initializes W .
3: In Bob:
4: for i to d do
5: Letting wi = ‖exi‖Alice.
6: for t to bi − 1 do
7: wi = wi × ‖eai‖Alice by protocol 4.
8: W = W × wi by protocol 4.
9: return ‖W‖Alice =
∥∥eab∥∥
Alice
to Bob.
Protocol 6 Converting Ciphertext:
∥∥eab∥∥
Alice
to
[[
eab
]]
Alice
Input Alice: (PKAlice−Paillier, SKAlice−Paillier) and (PKAlice−RSA,
SKAlice−RSA).
Input Bob:
∥∥eab∥∥
Alice
.
Output Bob:
[[
eab
]]
Alice
.
1: Bob uniformly picks r and computes
∥∥eab+r∥∥
Alice
by Protocol
5.
2: Bob sends
∥∥eab+r∥∥
Alice
to Alice.
3: Alice decrypts
∥∥eab+r∥∥
Alice
, obtains and sends
[[
eab+r
]]
Alice
to Bob.
4: Bob computes
[[
eab
]]
Alice
=
[[
eab+r
]]
Alice
× (er)−1 by
protocol 3.
5: return
[[
eab
]]
Alice
to Bob.
4) Secure changing the encryption cryptosystem: There
are multiple participants in Heda. Different participants have
their own encryption scheme (i.e., the certain plaintext space
and a pair of keys (PK,SK)). Homomorphic operations can
only be operated in the same plaintext space. For complete-
ness, we design two protocols converting ciphertext from one
encryption scheme to another while maintaining the under-
lying plaintext. The first (Protocol 6) switches
∥∥eab∥∥
Alice
to[[
eab
]]
Alice
satisfying Condition 3, and the other (Protocol 7)
switches [[b]]Alice to [[b]]Bob satisfying Condition 4.
Proposition 3 (The security of building blocks): Protocol
1 to 7 is secure in the honest-but-curious model.
VII. CONSTRUCTION OF HEDA
In this section, we introduce the overall framework of
Heda. In Heda, U is able to learn a model without learning
anything about the sensitive data of P , and in addition to
U , others should learn nothing about the model. The security
Protocol 7 Converting Ciphertext: [[b]]Alice to [[b]]Bob
Input Alice: (PKAlice, SKAlice) and PKBob.
Input Bob: [[b]]Alice.
Output Bob: [[b]]Bob.
1: Bob uniformly picks r and computes [[b+ r]]Alice by Protocol
1.
2: Bob sends [[b+ r]]Alice to Alice.
3: Alice decrypts [[b+ r]]Alice, obtains and sends [[b+ r]]Bob to
Bob.
4: return [[b]]Bob to Bob.
Algorithm 4 Privacy-Preserving Training
Each P’s Input: Di = {(xi, yi)}mi=1, (PKPi−Paillier,SKPi−Paillier)
and (PKPi−RSA,SKPi−RSA).
U’s Input: (PKU−Paillier, SKU−Paillier).
U’s Output: β.
1: U initializes β.
2: According to S, each P divides all features in two part: the high
scores part and the low scores part.
3: each P obtains the noise dataset from the low scores part
subdataset by Algorithm 3 and sends it to U .
4: U trains a model by building blocks (Algorithm 5) combine with
noised datasets.
5: return β to U .
proof will be given in Section VIII.
Heda is exhibited in Algorithm 4. We introduce the
following details in this section: how to use feature evaluation
technologies to divide a dataset into two parts (Algorithm 4
Step 2), how to construct a specific training algorithm using
building blocks (Algorithm 4 Step 4), and how to combine DP
mechanism with the building blocks (Algorithm 4 Step 4).
Proposition 4 (The Security of Heda): Algorithm 4 is se-
cure in the honest-but-curious model.
A. Feature Partitioning
Obviously, It is best that each P conducts the feature
evaluation locally. The locally computation does not require
interaction with any other party which guarantee the privacy
of each P . In addition, P can perform arbitrary computations
on their sensitive data in plaintext case with high efficiency.
After Several P who join in Heda locally implement feature
evaluation, they communicate with each other negotiating the
final scores S. Feature scores do not reveal the privacy of
datasets, so it is feasible that several P share the scores of
their datasets and negotiate the final feature scores.
8
According to the feature scores S, each P processes the
dataset into an ordered dataset. Let an ordered dataset D =
{A1, A2, ..Ad} ordered by feature scores, i.e. Si is the scores
of Ai, Si > Sj , 0 < i < j < d. Let the high scores part
has ι features, then D =
{
D 1, D 2
}
, D 1 = {A1, A2, ..Aι},
D 2 = {Aι+1, Aι+2, ..Ad}.
We assume that U spends t1 in learning a classifier param-
eters on the low scores part (the noise dataset) and t2 on the
high scores part (the encrypted dataset), then the total time
is T = t1 + t2. Training a model in plaintext case usually
takes time in milliseconds but usually takes thousands of
seconds or longer in ciphertext case [10], [11]. There is a linear
relationship between t2 and ι, i.e. t2 ≈ τι + b, where ι > 0,
τ and b are two constants. The training time on noise dataset
is much less than the time training a model on the encrypted
dataset. Formula 2 shows the total time consumption.
T ≤ τ (ι+ 1) + b (2)
Heda enables flexible switch among different tradeoffs
between efficiency and accuracy by parameter tuning. With pa-
rameter ι, one is able to obtain the tradeoff between efficiency
and accuracy. As the decreasing number of the ι, the total
time consumption is consequent reduction. When the number
of dimensions assigned to the high scores part is small, the
accuracy is relatively low. According to the specific situations,
ι is set appropriately.
As for the selection of feature evaluation techniques, many
excellent feature evaluation techniques have been studied [8],
[21]. When facing a dataset with different types, different
backgrounds or different magnitude, different methods have
their drawbacks as well as merits. We evaluate six widely
used methods in our experiments. The methods we use are:
Chi-square test, Kruskal-Wallis H (KW), Pearson correlation,
Spearman correlation, Random forest and minimal Redun-
dancy Maximal Relevance (mRMR). We are committed to
finding a feature evaluation technique with the best robustness.
After extensive experiments, we find that KW has the most
stable effect when facing with different datasets (see Section
IX-D).
B. Constructing Specific Training Algorithms using Building
Blocks
There are rich variety of ML algorithms. Describing the
implementation of building blocks towards each ML training
algorithm naturally requires space beyond the page limit. We
use LR6 as an example to illustrate how to construct secure
model training algorithms by our building blocks.
LR training algorithm is not the most complicated one
compared to other ML classifier training algorithms. How-
ever, the iterative process of LR involves sigmoid function
(Sigmoid
(
βTxi
)
= e
βT xi
1+eβ
T xi
) which makes it difficult to
implement in ciphertext case. Most studies claimed they had
constructed a secure LR training algorithm by HC which were
the secure linear regression training algorithms actually, or
they solved the sigmoid function by an approximate equation
(cf. Section II-B). To best of our knowledge, it is the first
6In order to maintain the continuity of our description, LR is also used as
the example in the following
Algorithm 5 privacy-preserving training of LR
Each P’s Input: Di = {(xi, yi)}mi=1, (PKPi−Paillier,SKPi−Paillier)
and (PKPi−RSA,SKPi−RSA).
U’s Input: (PKU−Paillier, SKU−Paillier).
U’s Output: β.
1: U initializes a learning rate α, a fixed number of iterations Cycles
and β.
2: while t in Cycles or minimum learning rate is not reached do
3: Pi sends (
[[
m∑
i=1
XY
]]
Pi
) to U .
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: Pi sends (
∥∥eX∥∥Pi ,
[[
m∑
i=1
XY
]]
Pi
) to U .
6: U obtains [[eβX ]]Pi by Protocol 5 and Protocol 6 sequen-
tially.
7: U uniformly picks r and computes [[eβX+r + er]]Pi by
Protocol 1 and Protocol 4 sequentially.
8: U sends [[eβX+r + er]]Pi to P .
9: P decrypts [[eβX+r + er]]Pi and sends[[
X
eβX+r+er
]]
Pi
to U .
10: U obtains
[[
X
e−βX+1
]]
Pi
by Protocol 3.
11: U obtains
[[
m∑
i=1
(
X e
βX
1+eβX
−XY
)]]
Pi
by Protocol 1
and Protocol 2 sequentially.
12: U obtains
[[
m∑
i=1
(
X e
βX
1+eβX
−XY
)]]
U
by Protocol 7.
13: U updates β by
m∑
i=1
(
X e
βX
1+eβX
−XY
)
.
14: return β to U .
constructing a secure LR training algorithm by HC. Our HC-
based secure LR training algorithm only needs 3 interactions
(i.e. interactions between U and P) throughout each iteration
process.
LR is a binary classifier and try to learn a pair of parameters
w and b, where w = (w1, w2, . . . , wd) to satisfy f {xi} =
wTxi + b and f {xi} ∼= yi. LR uses Sigmoid Function to
associate the true label yi with the prediction label f {xi}.
Let β = (w, b), X = (x, 1), the iteration formula of LR is
shown in Formula (3). The steps of LR training algorithm are
as follows: (i) Initializing learning rate α, a fixed number of
iterations and model parameters β. (ii) Updating β by Formula
(3). (iii) If the maximum number of iterations or minimum
learning rate is reached, output β; otherwise go to step 2.
βt+1j = β
t
j −
α
m
m∑
i=1
xij
(
eβ
T xi
1 + eβT xi
− yi
)
(3)
Each building block is designed in a modular way, so
carrying out secure LR training algorithm come down to
invoking the right module. Suppose there are n data providers
P , Algorithm 5 specifies our secure LR training algorithm. In
all execution steps of Algorithm 5, when protocols are called,
P is the role of Alice, and U is the role of Bob.
Proposition 5: Algorithm 5 is secure in the honest-but-
curious model.
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C. Combining Differential Privacy Mechanism with Our
Building Blocks
In this sub-section we present our solution of combining
DP mechanism with building blocks, that is, how to train a
ML classifier on the mixed dataset that combine an encrypted
dataset and a noise dataset.
The idea is simple but effective: We still let the high scores
part has ι features. After requesting data from P , U obtains a
dataset mixed with the encrypted dataset and the noise dataset,
as depict in Figure 3. In the process of iteratively updating
parameters, learning rate in the high scores part is computed
by Algorithm 5, and learning rate in the low scores part is
computed by Formula 3 just as in normal plaintext case.
Here, we present a simplified example to understand:
Suppose we are computing w = X+Y . X = {[x1] , [x2] , . . . ,
[xι] , xι+1, xι+2, . . . , xd}, Y = {[y1 ], [ y2 ], . . . , [ yι] , yι+1,
yι+2, . . . , yd}. Then, w = {[x1 + y1], [x2 + y2], . . . , [xι + yι]
, xι+1 + yι+1, xι+2 + yι+2, . . . , xd + yd}. Analogous, when
the training algorithm updates parameters, the learning rate
of the encrypted dataset is computed by Algorithm 5, and the
learning rate of the noise dataset is computed as normal.
Encrypted Data Noise Data
𝛊+ 𝟏 𝛊+ 𝟐 …… 𝐝 
𝑥1(ι+1) 𝑥1(ι+2) ... 𝑥1𝑑  
𝑥2(ι+1) 𝑥2(ι+2) ... 𝑥1𝑑  
… … ... … 
𝑥𝑚(ι+1) 𝑥𝑚(ι+2) ... 𝑥1𝑑  
 
 
 1 2 …… 𝛊 𝛊+ 𝟏 𝛊+ 𝟐 …… 𝐝 
1 [𝑥11] [𝑥12] ... [𝑥1ι] 𝑥1(ι+1) 𝑥1(ι+2) ... 𝑥1𝑑  
2 [𝑥21] [𝑥21] ... [𝑥2ι] 𝑥2(ι+1) 𝑥2(ι+2) ... 𝑥2𝑑  
… … … ... … … … ... … 
m [𝑥𝑚1] [𝑥𝑚1] ... [𝑥𝑚ι] 𝑥𝑚(ι+1) 𝑥𝑚(ι+2) ... 𝑥𝑚𝑑  
 
1 2 …… 𝛊 
[𝑥11] [x12] ... [x1ι ] 
[𝑥21] [x21] ... [x2ι ] 
… … ... … 
[𝑥𝑚1] [xm1 ] ... [xm ι] 
 
Fig. 3. A Mixed Dataset: the Encrypted Dataset Combine with the Noise
Dataset.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
When facing the honest-but-curious adversaries, we follow
a commonly used definition – secure two-party computation
(cf. Appendix A) and a useful theorem – modular sequential
composition (cf. Appendix B). We present our security proofs
according to the ideas of these two definitions. For more
details, we refer the reader to [16] for secure two-party
computation and [7] for modular sequential composition.
Proof 3 (Proof of Proposition 3):
Security proof for Protocol 1, 2, 3 and 4: Protocol 1, 2
and 3 construct secure two-party computation using Paillier’s
additively homomorphic property. Protocol 4 constructs secure
two-party computation using RSA’s multiplicative homomor-
phic property. In these four protocols, Alice does not receive
any message whose view only consists in its input, and Alice
does not call to any other protocols. The security proofs of
these four protocols can be summarized as follows.
The input of Alice is (a,PKA,SKA), Bob is (b or [b]A,
PKA).
As Alice does not receive any message, Alice’s view only
consists in its input. Hence the simulator SpiA (a, F (a, b)) =
viewpiA (a,PKA,SKA).
Bob’s view is viewpiB (b or [b]A,PKA, [a]A, OutputB). a
is encrypted by PKA, and the confidentiality of [a]A is
equivalent to the cryptosystem, thereby Bob cannot infer
the value of [a]A straightforward. The simulator S
pi
B does
the following: (i) Generates l random coins, obtains [c]A =
[{c1, c2, . . . , cl}]A by PKA, where l is the length of a. (ii) Out-
puts ([c]A,PKA, b or [b]A, [f(c, b)]A). By semantic security of
the used cryptosystem: ([c]A,PKA, b or [b]A, [F (c, b)]A) ≈
([a]A,PKA, b or [b]A, [F (a, b)]A).
Security proof for Protocol 5: The input of Alice is
(a,PKA,SKA), Bob is (b,PKA).
As Alice does not receive any message in this hybrid
model, Alice’s view only consists in its input. Hence the
simulator SpiA (a, F (a, b)) = view
pi
A (a,PKA,SKA).
Bob’s view is viewpiB (b,PKA, ||ea||A, Fprotocol−4(||ea||A,||b||A), OutputB). ea is encrypted by PKA, and the confiden-
tiality of ||ea||A is equivalent to the cryptosystem, So Bob
cannot infer its value straightforward. The simulation SpiB , on
input (b,PKA), dose the following: (i) Generates l random
coins, then obtains c = {c1, c2, . . . , cl} and ||ec||A by PKA,
where l is the length of a. (ii) Outputs
(
c,PKA,SKA, ||ecb||A,
Fprotocol−4 (||ec||A, ||b||A)). As RSA is semantically secure, the
distributions SpiB =
(
b,PKA, ||ec||A, ||ecb||A
)
and viewpiB =(
b,PKA, ||ea||A, ||eab||A
)
are computationally indistinguish-
able.
As Protocol 4 is secure in the honest-but-curious model,
we obtain the security of the Protocol 5 using Theorem 2.
Security proof for Protocol 6: The function is F :
F
(||eab||A,PKP,SKP,PKR,SKR) = (φ, [[eab]]A).
Alice’s view is viewpiA =
(
[[eab+r]]A,PKP,SKP,PKR,
SKR, outputProtocal−3,), and outputProtocal−3 = ||eab+r||A.
SpiA runs as follows: (i) Generates l random coins, then obtains
c = {c1, c2, . . . , cl} and [[ec]]A by PKP, where l is the length
of (ab+ r). (ii) Outputs (||ec||A, [[ec]]A,PKP,SKP,PKR,SKR
). (ab+r) and c are taken from the same distribution, indepen-
dently from any other parameter. Paillier and RSA is seman-
tically secure. So (||ec||A, [[ec]]A,PKP,SKP,PKR,SKR) ≈(||eab+r||A, [[eab+r]]A,PKP,SKP,PKR,SKR).
Bob’s view is viewpiB =
(||eab||A, ||eab+r||A, r, [[eab+r]]A),
SpiB runs as follows: (i) Generates l random coins, obtains c ={c1, c2, . . . , cl}, where l is the length of ab. (ii) obtains [ec]A
and [ec+r]A by PKP. (ii) Outputs (||ec||A, ||ec+r||A, [[ec+r]]A,
r,PKP,SKP,PKR,SKR). The distribution of c and ab are
identical and RSA is semantically secure, so the real distri-
bution
{
r, ||eab||A
}
and the ideal distribution {r, ||ec||A} are
statistically indistinguishable.
As Protocol 3 is secure in the honest-but-curious model,
we obtain the security of the Protocol 6 using Theorem 2.
Security proof for Protocol 7: The function is F : F ([[b]]A,
PKA,SKA,PKB,SKB) = (φ, [[b]]B).
Alice’s view is viewpiA = ([[b+ r]]A,PKA,SKA,PKB). S
pi
A
runs as follows: (i) Generates l random coins and obtains
[[c]]A = [[{c1, c2, . . . , cl}]]A by PKA, where l is the length of
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(m+ r). (ii) Outputs ([[c]]B , [[c]]A,PKA,SKA,PKB). (b+ r)
and c are taken from the same distribution, independently from
any other parameter, and Paillier is semantically secure, so
([[c]]B , [[c]]A,PKP,SKP,PKR,SKR) ≈ ([[b+ r]]B , [[b+ r]]A,
PKP,SKP,PKR,SKR).
Bob’s view is viewpiB = ([[b]]A, [[b+ r]]A, r,PKB,SKB,
PKA), SpiB runs as follows: (i) Generates l random coins and
obtains [[c]]A = [[{c1, c2, . . . , cl}]]A by PKA, where l is the
length of m. (ii) Outputs ([[c]]B , [[c+ r]]]A, r,PKB,SKB,PKA
). The distribution of c and m are identical, and Paillier is
semantically secure, so the real distribution {[[m]]B , [[m+ r
]]A, r; [[m+ r]]B} and the ideal distribution {[[c]]B , [[c+ r]]
A, r; [[c+ r]]B} are statistically indistinguishable.
As Protocol 1 is secure in the honest-but-curious model,
we obtain the security of the Protocol 7 using Theorem 2. 
Proof 4 (Proof of Proposition 5): Since each Pi behaves
in the same way, we use Pi substitute each P’s behavior in
this security proof.
U’s view is viewpiU =
(
PKU ,SKU , [[eX ]]Pi , ||eX ||Pi ,
[[eXβ ]]Pi , [[
X
eβX+r+er
]]Pi , [[
m∑
i=1
X e
βX
1+eβX
]]
Pi
, OutputU
)
. As
intermediate results are encrypted by the public key of each Pi,
and Paillier and RSA is semantically secure, thus the sensitive
information of each Pi is computationally indistinguishable
in intermediate results. What we need to discuss is the
confidentiality of OutputU =
(
β,
m∑
i=1
(
X e
βX
1+eβX
−XY
))
,
that is, whether U can guess the sensitive information of each
Pi from OutputU successfully.
Obviously a =
m∑
i=1
(
X e
βX
1+eβX
−XY
)
is a no-solution
equation for the unknown x and the known β. In addition to
brute force cracking, there is no other better way to get the
value of X . We assume a small dataset has 2-dimensional 100
instances, and the length of each dimension is 32 bits7. Then
the probability that U guesses success is 1
232×d×m =
1
26400 . It
is a negligible probability of success [20].
Pi’s view is viewpiPi =
(
PKPi ,SKPi ,
[[
eβX+r + er
]]
Pi ,
||eX ||Pi , [[eX ]]Pi
)
. Pi does not output any message. Hence
the simulator SpiPi = view
pi
Pi . Pi runs as follows: (i)
Generates l random coins and obtains c = {c1, c2, . . . , cl},
where l is the length of r. (ii) Uniformly picking
m = {m1,m2, . . . ,md}, where m ∈ MPi . (iii) Output(
PKPi ,SKPi ,
[[
emX+c + ec
]]
Pi
)
. The distribution of (c,m)
and (r, β) are identical, so the real distribution (PKPi ,SKPi ,[[
eβX+r + er
]]
Pi
)
and the ideal distribution (PKPi ,SKPi ,
[[emX+c + ec]]Pi
)
are statistically indistinguishable.
As those Protocols used in Algorithm 5 are secure in the
honest-but-curious model, we obtain the security of Algorithm
5 using Theorem 2. 
Proof 5 (Proof of Proposition 4):
Each P computes feature scores by feature evaluation
technologies locally, obtains the noise dataset by Algorithm
3, and interacts with U to process the encrypted dataset by
Algorithm 5. U trains a LR classifier with the encrypted
datasets by Algorithm 5.
7Typically, single-precision floating-point occupies 4 bytes (32-bit) memory
space.
As those Protocols or Algorithms used in Algorithm 4 are
secure in the honest-but-curious model, we obtain the security
using Theorem 2. 
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We present the evaluation of Heda in this section. We
answer the following questions in our evaluations toward
Heda: (i) the performance of our DP components, (ii) the
performance of our building blocks, and (iii) the performance
overhead of Heda.
A. Preparations
1) Implementations: Our experiments were run using a
desktop computer with configuration: single Intel i7 (i7-3770
64bit) processor for total 4 cores running at 3.40GHz and
8 GB RAM. We have implemented the building blocks, DP
components, Heda, and mRMR in Java Development Kit 1.8.
Feature selection algorithms including Chi-square test, Pearson
correlation, Spearman correlation, Random forest and KW
have been implemented in scikit-learn8.
The operations of Paillier and RSA are carried out in
finite fields involving modular arithmetic operations on in-
tegers, while classifiers training generally use floating point
numbers. In order to encrypted data taking real values, it is
necessary to previously perform a format conversion into an
integer representation. According to the international standard
IEEE 754, binary floating point number D is expressed as
D = (−1)s×M×2E , where s is the sign bit, M is a significant
number, and E is the exponent bit. We employ it to perform
the format conversion toward our implementations. Overlength
effective bits lead to inefficient algorithms, while underlength
effective bits may low the accuracy. We retained two decimal
places empirically.
Plaintext should be guaranteed in the plaintext space of
the used cryptosystem. So we must consider the key length
to avoid the possibility of overflow. After analyzing all the
intermediate results, Paillier’s key N is set to 2048-bit and
RSA’s key N is 2048-bit.
2) Datasets: Four datasets from the UCI ML repository
[12] originated from several different application domains are
used in our evaluation: (i) Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Di-
agnostic) Dataset (BCWD), (ii) Adult Dataset (Adult), (iii)
Credit Approval Dataset (CAD), (iv) Car Evaluation Dataset
(Car). The statistics are shown in Table III. In order to avoid
overfitting or contingent results, we show the average results
of cross-validation of 10 runs. In each cross-validation, we
randomly take 80% to train the model, and the remainder for
testing.
B. Evaluation of Differential Privacy Components
In DP mechanism, we employ IMA to reduce the sensitivity
∆f and give a formula to determining the appropriate privacy
budget . We recall that the best cluster size is k =
√
m
2 , i.e.
the best cluster size of the four datasets – BCWD, Adult, CAD
and Car – are 16, 127, 18 and 29 respectively. Standard DP (cf.
Definition 4) is the baseline for comparison, where the  for
8http://scikit-learn.org
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TABLE III. STATISTICS OF DATASETS
Datasets Instances
number
Attributes
number
Discrete
attributes
Numerical
attributes
BCWD 699 9 0 9
Adult 32561 14 8 6
CAD 690 15 9 6
Car 1728 6 0 6
each dataset is obtained by Algorithm 1. The scheme proposed
by Soria et al. [28] is employed to serve as a control group
named IMDAV, which is the state of the art for reducing the
sensitivity in DP mechanisms based on IMA. Sum of Squared
Errors (SSE) is used to evaluate the information loss of the
dataset, and the percentage of Record Linkages (RL) is used
to evaluate the risk of privacy leak.
For a given dataset D and an -DP dataset D with
microaggregation of k size, SSE (Formula 4) is defined as the
sum of squares of attribute distances between original records
in D and their versions in the -DP dataset D.
SSE =
∑
Aj∈D,A′j∈D′
∑
xij∈Aj ,x′ij∈A
′
j
(
xij − x′ij
)2
(4)
We implement our DP components (Algorithm 3), Standard
DP and IMDAV on the four datasets with different cluster
sizes, then record different SSE values. The results are depicted
in Figure 4. It is clear that our DP components have low
information loss compare to IMDAV. When k =
√
m
2 , our
DP components have lower SSE than Baseline.
Insufficient noise may cause privacy cannot be guaranteed.
RL is the percentage of records of the original dataset D that
can be correctly matched from the -DP dataset D. R is the
set of original records that are at minimum distance from D,
and RL is defined as: RL =
∑
xi∈D Pr
(
x
′
i
)
n , where Pr
(
x
′
i
)
={
0 if xi ∈ R
1
|R| if xi ∈ R . We record the RL on the four datasets for
different cluster sizes and show the results in Figure 5. We
can see from the Figure 5 that our RL is roughly the same
as IMDAV, though our SSE is much lower than it, and our
RL is lower than the Baseline when k =
√
m
2 . The lines in
Figure 5(b) and 5(c) are not smooth, the phenomenon of which
may be caused by the discrete attributes in Dataset Adult and
Dataset CAD.
The smaller SSE means the less loss of information, and the
smaller RL means the less risk of privacy leak. In conjunction
with Figure 4 and Figure 5, comparing to the Baseline and
IMDAV, our DP components in Heda have higher security
and less information loss when the cluster size is given the
best value k =
√
m
2 .
C. Evaluation of Building Blocks
The way to use our building blocks constructing a secure
ML training algorithm (cf. Section VII-B) and the security
analysis of our building blocks (cf. Section VIII) have been
given. In this subsection, we evaluate building blocks in terms
of time consumption, accuracy and the number of interactions
(round trips), taking Algorithm 5 as an example. A widely
used criterion – accuracy ( #correctly classified instances#total instances ) is
employed to evaluate the accuracy, and standard LR9 is im-
plemented as a control group. Table IV(a) gives the running
time of each building block (Protocol 1 to Protocol 7) with en-
crypted four datasets on Algorithm 5, where Protocol 6 named
Exchange 1, and Protocol 7 named Exchange 2. Table IV(b)
gives the total time consumption, accuracy and communication
overhead.
As the performance results in Table IV(a) and Table IV(b),
training a model by Algorithm 5 not only has almost no loss
of accuracy, but also has the acceptable time consumption.
In experiments, we linearly simulate several P , and the time
consumption of P in Table IV(b) is the accumulation of time
spent by several P . In actual application scenarios, several P
conduct algorithms in parallel, so that the time consumption
of P and the total time consumption can be decreased sharply.
We just show the raw running time to better illustrate the
performance of building blocks. We believe our building
blocks to be practical for sensitive applications.
When the datasets become very large, the trained models
have almost no loss of accuracy as shown in Table IV(b).
Results even show an increase in accuracy when evaluating on
dataset Car. The increase is because local optimal values are
chosen when initializing model parameters β, and it also shows
secure training algorithms constructed by our building blocks
would not affect the accuracy. It is worth mentioning that
our building blocks construct a secure LR training algorithm
without use the Authorization Server and any approximate
equation and it is the first solving the sigmoid function in
secure LR based on HC.
D. Evaluation of Heda
We want to find a more robust feature evaluation method
for serving Heda, i.e., finding a method that is able to divide
the dataset into the high scores part and the low scores part
more accurately. We implement six widely used methods and
evaluate each of them as following steps: (i) Computing the
scores of each attribute by the feature evaluation method, (ii)
According to the scores, obtaining ordered datasets (cf. Section
VII-A), (iii) Obtaining a new sub-dataset by removing a feature
with the lowest scores, then conducting an evaluation on this
new sub-dataset, (iv) Repeating step (iii) until there is only one
dimensional data left in the dataset. We suppose that step (iii) is
able to get an ordered sub-dataset that gets the smallest decline
in accuracy compared to the previous sub-dataset. We use the
standard LR evaluating each sub-dataset obtained from step
(iii) and record the results. Because of the layout restrictions,
we only show the results of the dataset Adult and Car. Adult
is the dataset with a large amount of data. Car represents the
datasets that has only numerical attributes. Figure 6 visualizes
the results, where accuracy is employed to measure the quality
of datasets.
With respect to the six feature selection algorithms in
Figure 6, we find that KW (Green lines) has a more stable
performance no matter facing with a all numeric attribute
dataset (Car as shown in Figure 6(b)) or a large amount of
data dataset with numerical attributes and discrete attributes
9A LR model that are trained and tested non-privately using scikit-learn
(http://scikit-learn.org).
12
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
k
103
104
105
106
SS
E(
Lo
g1
0)
k = 16
Baseline
Heda
IMDAV
(a) BCWD
10 45 80 115 150 185 220 255 290
k
1010
1011
1012
1013
SS
E(
Lo
g1
0)
k = 127
Baseline
Heda
IMDAV
(b) Adult
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36
k
107
108
109
SS
E(
Lo
g1
0)
k = 18
Baseline
Heda
IMDAV
(c) CAD
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60
k
103
104
105
106
SS
E(
Lo
g1
0)
k = 29
Baseline
Heda
IMDAV
(d) Car
Fig. 4. Differential Privacy Components Performance: Sum of Squared Errors.
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Fig. 5. Differential Privacy Components Performance: Record Linkages.
TABLE IV. BUILDING BLOCKS PERFORMANCE
(a) The running time of each building block
Datasets Add Subtraction Dot Product Multiplication Power Function Exchange 1 Exchange 2
BCWD 1462ms 268ms 372ms 2400ms 2452ms 61510ms 18ms
Adult 17026ms 5710ms 2759ms 47012ms 52291ms 1112344ms 17ms
CAD 8643ms 546ms 1114ms 18882ms 20906ms 411493ms 16ms
Car 2752ms 374ms 890ms 5800ms 6515ms 295934ms 22ms
(b) The total time, accuracy and communication overhead
Datasets Standard LR Secure LR Total Time U Time P Time Interactions
BCWD 96.595% 95.422% 2428s 32s 2396s 189
Adult 82.590% 81.578% 41145s 459s 40685s 1500
CAD 85.607% 84.463% 17346s 252s 17094s 1173
Car 72.32% 72.68% 10458s 122s 10335s 1122
(a) Adult (b) Car
Fig. 6. Feature Evaluation Performance
(Adult as shown in Figure 6(a)). More accurate scores are able
to be obtained by KW, so we use KW as our feature evaluation
algorithm in the following.
Recalling the steps of Heda, after obtaining the mixed
dataset, it computes model parameters on the mixed dataset.
Assuming the high scores part has ι features. We record and
observe the changes in terms of accuracy and time consump-
tion of Algorithm 4 when ι changes from 1 to d. Results are
depicted in Figure 7, where “U Time in HC” and “U Time
in DP” represent the training time spent by U on encrypted
datasets and noise datasets respectively. After the dataset is
published as the noise dataset by DP mechanism, several P
are no longer involved in the training process, so the “P Time”
is just the time consumption for several P participating in the
encrypted dataset training.
1) Efficiency: As can be seen from Figure 7, the total time
consumption linearly increases as the ι grows, which is in line
with our preset Formula 2. When ι = d, Heda has the lowest
efficiency. But when ι changes to 1 (i.e., the number of the
encrypted attributes are 1), we obtain the highest efficiency,
and the total time consumption of Heda spent on each dataset
can be reduced by more than 70% compare to when ι = d.
When ι becomes smaller, the efficiency of Heda becomes
higher. The application needs to quickly train a model on sen-
sitive datasets could set ι to one to obtain the model parameters
as quickly as possible. Results show that Heda is able to
train a model within one hour in the face with different scales
encrypted datasets. We linearly simulate several P , and several
P could conduct Algorithms in parallel in practical application,
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Fig. 7. Heda Performance. The bars represent the time consumption of Heda, and the line represents the accuracy.
so the time consumption of P and the total time consumption
can be decreased sharply again. The time consumption on
noise datasets is less than 1 second, because noise datasets
is in the plaintext case, the speed of computing in plaintext
case is much faster than computing on the encrypted data.
2) Accuracy: We observe from Figure 7 that training speed
become faster with smaller ι, but the accuracy is reduced,
which indicates that the noise dataset does affect the dataset
quality to a certain extent. Nevertheless, results show that even
when the minimum value of ι is taken, the trained classifier
accuracy does not be reduced much (not more than 8%).
According to the requirements of specific applications, one can
adjust ι appropriately to obtain a tradeoff between accuracy
and time consumption.
Feature evaluation techniques help ML training algorithms
remove redundant or noisy attributes, and adding appropriate
noise is able to smooth out discrete attributes which has been
quantized. So the accuracy is a slightly increased, when ι = 5
in the mixed dataset CAD, as depicted in Figure 7(c).
3) Some discussions: Heda obtains the tradeoffs between
efficiency and accuracy by jointly applying HC and DP in an
individual scheme, and enables flexible switch among different
tradeoffs by parameter tuning. A small ι is able to achieve high
efficiency and a slight loss in accuracy (In our experiments,
the loss is not worse than 8%.). Different application scenarios
pay different attention to efficiency and accuracy. According
to the requirements of specific applications, developers can
obtain a balance between accuracy and efficiency by adjusting
ι appropriately.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel efficient privacy-
preserving ML classifier training algorithm named Heda. By
jointly applying HC and DP, Heda obtained the balance be-
tween efficiency and accuracy, enabled flexible switch among
different tradeoffs by parameter tuning. In order to make Heda
more efficient and accurate, we developed a library of building
blocks base on HC, gave a formula for determining the
appropriate privacy budget, and reduced the sensitivity of the
query function by IMA in DP mechanism. We demonstrated
the efficiency of Heda and our algorithms. In the future work,
we plan to explore a generalized framework which enables
constructing a wide range of privacy-preserving ML classifier
training algorithms.
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APPENDIX
A. Secure two-party computation
For all our two-party protocols, to ensure security, we
have to show that whatever Alice (Bob) can compute from
its interactions with Bob (Alice) can be computed from its
input and output, which leads to a commonly used definition
secure two-party computation (e.g., [6], [11], [16]).
We follow the notations of Bost et al. [6]: Let F =
(FA, FB) be a (probabilistic) polynomial function and pi a
protocol computing F ; Alice and Bob want to compute F (a, b)
where a is Alice’s input and b is Bob’s input, using pi
and with the security parameter λ; The view of party Alice
during the execution of pi is the tuple viewpiAlice(λ, a, b) =
(λ; a;m1,m2, ...,mn) where m1,m2, ...,mn are the mes-
sages received by Alice. We define the view of Bob sim-
ilarly. Let outputpiAlice(a, b) and output
pi
Bob(a, b) denote Al-
ice’s and Bob’s outputs respectively. The global output as
outputpi(a, b) = (outputpiAlice(a, b), output
pi
Bob(a, b)).
Definition 6: (Secure Two-Party Computation) [6], [16]. A
protocol pi privately computes f with statistical security if for
all possible inputs (a, b) and simulators SAlice and SBob hold
the following properties10:
{SAlice, f2(a, b)} ≈ {viewpiAlice(a, b), outputpi(a, b)}
{f1(a, b), SBob} ≈ {outputpi(a, b), viewpiBob(a, b)}
B. Modular sequential composition
For our protocols and algorithms are constructed in a
modular way, we use the following useful sequential modular
composition (Theorem 2) [7]: The Parties run a protocol pi and
use calls to an ideal functionality F in pi (e.g. A and B compute
F privately by sending their inputs to a trusted third party and
receiving the results); If we can show that pi respects privacy in
the honest-but-curious model and if we have a protocol ρ that
privately computes F in the same model, then we can replace
the ideal calls for F by the execution of ρ in pi; the new
protocol, denoted piρ is then secure in the honest-but-curious
model [6], [7]. We assume an incorruptible trusted party T for
evaluating functionalities (F1, F2, . . . , Fn) − hybrid model.
10≈ denotes computational indistinguishability against probabilistic poly-
nomial time adversaries with negligible advantage in the security parameter
λ.
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Parties not communicate until receiving T’s output (i.e. se-
quential composition). Let pi be a two-party protocol in the
(F1, F2, . . . , Fn) − hybrid model, and ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn be real
protocols (i.e. protocols in the semi-honest model) computing
F1, F2, . . . , Fn. All ideals calls of pi to the trusted party for
Fi is replaced by a real execution of ρi.
Theorem 2: (Modular Sequential Composition) restated as
in [6]. Let F1, F2, . . . , Fn be two-party probabilistic poly-
nomial time functionalities and ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn protocols that
compute respectively F1, F2, . . . , Fn in the presence of semi-
honest adversaries. Let G be a two-party probabilistic polyno-
mial time functionality and pi a protocol that securely computes
G in the (F1, F2, . . . , Fn)− hybrid model in the presence of
semi-honest adversaries. Then piρ1,ρ2,...,ρn securely computes
G in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
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